Ultimately it was probably the collapse of structural functionalist theory that made the functional definitions seem less plausible. Since the late 1960s, models of society that emphasize equilibrium, gradual evolution and reasonably harmonious integration, no longer seem adequate. In response to the crisis of functionalist theory, and its definitions of religion, substantive definitions enjoyed a remarkable comeback after a long period of disrepute (O'Toole 1984:27) . Although there may be a broad consensus that substantive definitions are preferable, this has by no means led to agreement about what that substantive element should be.
Convinced neither by functionalist theory, nor by the substantive content of Durkheim's definition, several anthropologists began to re-value Tylor's "belief in spiritual beings" definition (O'Toole 1984:27ff) . Critics took issue with Durkheim's insistence on the sacred/profane distinction, since in many cultures such distinctions do not exist (Worsley 1968 ). Thus, if functional definitions are no longer plausible, and the sacred is a Western religious notion, then there is an obvious need to find an alternative way of defining religion.
While agreeing with Durkheim that "belief in spiritual beings" is a Western conception of religion, anthropologists such as Robin Horton and Melford Spiro have argued that Tylor's definition of religion was nonetheless close to the mark (O'Toole 1984:27-36 ).
Spiro agrees with Durkheim that there are many problems with using the notion of "spirit" as the essence of religion. Many societies think of "spirits" in a way that we would not recognize as such, or attribute to "natural" processes things that Westerners would associate with the belief in "spirits". The belief in spirits as the essence of religion is a Western, ethnocentric idea that ends up being super-imposed on a wide diversity of beliefs and cosmologies. Spiro argues, however, that "superhuman beings" are universal in all religions. This being the case, he defines religion as "an institution consisting of culturally patterned interaction with culturally postulated superhuman beings" (Spiro 1966:96) . Spiro argued that Durkheim and other Western observers have noticed only the non-theistic nature of élite forms of Buddhism, but they are mistaken to suggest that there are no "gods" or "spirits" or "superhuman beings" in Theravada Buddhism. The Buddha is a superhuman being in popular forms of the Theravada tradition, and he is not alone-many other superhuman beings also populate their cosmology.
The matter of Buddhism is far from settled, however, as others have taken issue with Spiro's argument. Malcolm Hamilton (1995:14-15, 71-79) argues that while Theravada Buddhism is a religion, the Buddha is not a "superhuman being" (although he may have been), since when he passed into enlightenment, he ceased to exist "as an independent ego". There are superhuman beings, or "spirits" in some expressions of Theravada Buddhism, but there are not in other communities of the same traditionincluding many popular communities (Herbrechtsmeier 1993) . As Herbrechtsmeier observes, Theravada is not the only Buddhist tradition which denies the existence of "gods", "spirits" and "superhuman beings". Others include the historically important Hinayana schools, and the contemporary Rinzai Zen tradition (1993) .
Evidently, belief in "super-human beings" is not essential for defining Buddhism, let alone religion in general. Moreover, Hamilton observes, "super-human" is a very ambiguous concept. Who counts as a "super-human"? Many non-religious figures have been seen as "superhuman", and many religious objects, spirits, and symbols are not treated as being "above" humans or as "superhuman"-think, for example of the disrespect shown to the images of non-compliant saints in popular Catholicism (Hamilton 1995) . According to Herbrechtsmeier, Spiro's notion of the "super-human" shows a profound misunderstanding of what "human" is in the samsara worldview of the Buddhists. In this belief system, the ability to do "wondrous things" does not make a person anything more, or less than, human (1993). Stark and Bainbridge (1996) have also followed the substantive tradition of Tylor in their 'rational-choice' models of religion. They make the "supernatural" the essence of religion. Religions are "systems of general compensators based on supernatural assumptions" (1996:39). The "supernatural" is then defined as "forces outside or beyond nature which can suspend, alter, or ignore physical forces" (39). There are obvious problems with this definition as well. Most serious is that they impose, in a distinctly heavy-handed manner, Western assumptions about the difference between "nature" (physical forces) and "super-nature". Peter Worsley addresses this kind of problem when he writes that the natives of Papua New Guinea, for example, do not make this distinction. They have "no impermeable membrane between the 'mundane' and the 'magical', for the primitive is not a dualist, operating with a model of 'two worlds', nor a schizophrenic operating with different principles-empirical and mystical-in different situations" (1968:xxvii).
The dualistic assumptions of such definitions (nature v. super-nature, mundane v. transcendent) emerge from the world-view of Western-more specifically Christian-culture.
As Roland Robertson observes:
[a] great analytic difficulty in the sociology of religion is the extent to which our basic conceptual apparatus is derived from the doctrines of Christian religions...The ideas of religion and religiosity are products of basically Christian thinking because of the tensions expressed in Christian doctrine as between on the one hand, social and terrestrial reality, and on the other, transcendent spiritual reality (Robertson 1970:43) .
Robertson, like many of his colleagues, has been dissatisfied with the narrow substantive definitions of religion, and has sought to provide one that is more inclusive and cross-cultural. He therefore defines religious culture as [t] hat set of beliefs and symbols (and values deriving directly therefrom) pertaining to a distinction between an empirical and a super-empirical, transcendent reality; the affairs of the empirical being subordinated in significance to the non-empirical (1970:47 emphasis added).
Robertson's use of the term "super-empirical", instead of "supernatural" is not much of an improvement, since it is unclear exactly what the term means. In physics, for example, both dark matter and sub-atomic particles are super-empirical theoretical constructs, at least insofar as neither may be directly observed. Belief in both, however, have significantly re-shaped the way in which physics looks at the empirical, so in that sense, the "empirical
[is] subordinated in significance to the non-empirical" (1970:47) . Therefore, if "super-empirical" is to mean anything at all, it probably means something like "transcendent". Robertson himself seems not entirely unaware of this problem, so he qualifies his notion of "super-empirical" by making this very clarification ("transcendent reality"). This qualification makes him guilty of the very charge that he brought against scholars who write a Christian concept of the "transcendent spiritual world" into a definition of religion which purports to be inclusive and cross-cultural.
Numerous other attempts have been made at defining religion in substantive terms. I think it is fair to say, however, that although many of them are useful, none are fully adequate, since they are all seen as either too narrow or too broad. Narrow definitions tend to exclude certain phenomena, such as Theravada Buddhism, that the participants by and large agree should be included. Others tend to include too much, and make it difficult to decide where religion 'ends', or how to distinguish it from political ideologies, scientific systems, or Girl Guide troupes (Swanson 1960 )-things which the participants in the debate would agree are not, properly speaking, "religions".
In light of these difficulties, it is easy to see why Weber, in a now famous statement, declined to define religion. He writes:
To define "religion," to say what it is, is not possible at the start of a presentation such as this. Definition can be attempted, if at all, only at the conclusion of the study One of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century, Ludwig Wittgenstein, argued that definitional discourse is "peculiar", in a way that ordinary language is not. Critiquing his own early work on logic, he writes (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.5): "The general form of propositions is: This is how things are."-That is the kind of proposition that one repeats to oneself countless times. One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing's nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it (1968: I § 114).
Most of the definitional attempts to "define religion" do just this. They do not "trace the outline of the thing's nature", but trace "round the frame through which we look at it" (1968) . But the question is, around which frame are we tracing? The sociological discussion that I have presented suggests that the debate traces around this denotative definition of religion. Indeed, it is only because of this implicit agreement that the debate can take place at all. All of the participants "know" what a religion is (Cargo Cults, Judaism, Theravada Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Bahai, etc.), they just cannot agree on a connotative definition that will adequately encompass all of the examples of religion that are presumed. This is especially true if we transpose complaints about ethnocentrism to complaints that particular definitions are too narrow. That is, ethnocentric definitions exclude, or do not adequately include, phenomena that we "know" are religions.
The Genealogy of "Religion" Most of the sociological attempts to define religion have involved the search for the essence of religion, that necessary condition which enables us to distinguish between religion and not-religion. This is due, in part, to the failure to live up to the sociological injunction to "always historicize" (cf. Jameson 1981) . In The Meaning and End of Religion Wilfred Cantwell Smith ([1962] 1978) historicizes religion by providing a genealogy of "religion" as a concept in the modern world, and in so doing casts doubt on the very prospects of finding such an essence. Despite, or perhaps because of, his particular theological agenda (cf. W.C. Smith 1981), Smith historicizes our conceptions, and demonstrates precisely why religion is so difficult to define iv . Cantwell Smith argues that "religion" is a modern and
Western phenomenon-at least in its origins.
Most languages have historically had no word that corresponds with our concept "religion" and the equivalent terms in contemporary non-European languages have been imported from the West. Even in Europe, for most of its history, the word "religion" (religio) meant something very different than it does today v . Smith argues that in early Latin texts, religio had to do with specific cultic rites and piety, rather than a "name for a system of ideas and beliefs " (1978:40) . With the partial exception of ante-Constantinian Christianity, this is the sense in which it is used even in the history of the West until it began to change in the seventeenth century.
Smith argues that even at the time of the Reformation, "religio" and its derivatives in the European vulgata still meant "piety" or "worship". The idea that religion "names a system of ideas and beliefs" emerges for the first time in the Enlightenment (1978:40) . In pamphlet after pamphlet, tract after tract, this new idea was driven home, either by polemicists or by apologists of particular traditions. At first, "religion" was something that someone else had, whereas the critic had "faith", "piety", or in the case of the Lumières, "rational thought". Slowly, however, people began to refer to their own faith as "religion", as they began to defend "true religion" (as a coherent system of beliefs and practices) against its critics.
The late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw the birth of two fundamentally new uses of the word "religion". First, was the use of the word "religions" (plural) to denote phenomena that were different, but somehow equivalent. Missions, particularly Catholic missions, and the encounter with "other religions" in trade and exploration, led for the first time to the concept of the "World Religions" (see also Jonathan Z. Smith 1998). The second was the use of "religion" as a generic "essence". Religion thus became a single thing for which we may ask the question "What is it? ".
"Religion" as we know it emerged out of the encounter with "other" religions (pluralism) and in the struggles to free society from the power of the church (differentiation).
So, while these are two of the major forces in the process of "secularization" (Berger 1967; Fenn 1978; Martin 1978) , they are also major factors in the genesis of "religion". Ironically, secularization and "religion" are not at all opposites; rather religion emerges out of the forces of secularization! Wilfred Cantwell Smith argues that "religion" is a troublesome construction, one that divides people who identify with different "religions", and that it provides a problematic basis for comparative study in the academy. He therefore urges academic specialists to abandon the concept altogether. We should rather both study and practice expressions of "faith".
Although The Meaning and End of Religion (1978) has become something of a classic among comparative religionists, most academic students of religion do not seem convinced enough to abandon the term altogether. As I see it, his major contribution is to offer us a "genealogy of religion" (in a Foucauldian sense), which should make us wary of looking for an essence in the first place. Smith's argument that "faith" should have priority over "religion", however, does not seem much of an improvement, and looks suspiciously like a kind of intellectual Protestant imperialism of all that we once called religion-sola fides! Finally, although it is easy to recognize that religion is a troublesome concept, it remains the common means of identifying a range of beliefs and practices in the modern world -not just for academics, but also for people within and without "religion".
Non-Essentialist Conceptions of Religion: Wittgenstein's Language Games
What we need, then, is a non-essentialist way of defining, or conceptualizing "religion". A number of scholars have recently proposed using Wittgenstein's approach to language games as a means of conceptualizing religion (Byrne 1988 , Saler 1993 , Smart 1988 ). These scholars have suggested that Wittgenstein's notion of "family resemblances" provides a way of defining religion without resorting to a singular (essential) element (gods, the sacred, belief in the transcendent) to distinguish religion from not-religion. In this section of the paper, I analyze Peter Byrne's (1988) explicitly Wittgensteinian approach to the question, followed by a discussion of Timothy Fitzgerald's critique of Byrne's article as a covertly essentialist argument. I will then present arguments made by Jonathan Z. Smith (1998) Benson Saler (1993) and Timothy Fitzgerald (1996 Fitzgerald ( , 1997 Fitzgerald ( , 2000 on the topic, and respond to them using Wittgenstein's analysis of language games. since we know that the possession of a significant number of these features in varying combinations will be enough to enable something to be a religion (1988:10).
In order to get this story straight, it is worth quoting Wittgenstein at length on "family resemblances". In this passage on "games", we could easily exchange "religion" for "games", and the examples of games for examples of religion. In this famous passage,
Wittgenstein writes:
Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic Games, and so on. What is common to them all?-Don't say "There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games' "-but look and see whether there is anything in common to all.-For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't think, but look! Look for example at board games; with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to card-games; here you will find many correspondences with the first group, but many common features drop out and others appear. When we pass next to ball games, much that is common is retained, but much is lost. And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities, overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities in detail (1968: I §66).
Wittgenstein thus demonstrates the futility of our searches for an essence of a simple concept such as "Game". There is no essence of Game, but rather a series of "family resemblances" (1968: I § 68) between the things we call "games". Thus, if we are looking to define "religion" we should not be looking for the element that distinguishes religion from not-religion, but we should explore a set of family resemblances between things that we call religion.
Timothy Fitzgerald (1996) , whose arguments in favor of abolishing the concept of "religion" altogether I will discuss shortly, has pointed to a number of different problems with Byrne's (1988) family resemblance approach to religion. Fitzgerald argues that in Byrne's argument, the concept of religion must have some essential characteristic, and if it does not, then the family of religion becomes so large as to be practically meaningless and analytically useless (1996:216).
Fitzgerald argues that if "religion" is not a hopelessly vague, theological term (and he firmly believes that it is), it must have an essence in Byrne's conception. Indeed, as Fitzgerald observes, the "sacred" repeatedly sneaks back into Byrne's argument, and effectively functions as a necessary condition for distinguishing religion from not-religion. According to
Fitzgerald,
The only point that "family resemblances" seems to establish in practical terms is that the word religion can be, or rather is, used in many different contexts and does not require an essence to give it meaning-except the sacred (1996:227).
Fitzgerald's observation that there is an essentialist, reified notion lurking in the background of Byrne's discussion seems warranted. That is, for Byrne, there "really is" such a thing as religion-akin to the platonic theory of "Gameness" that Wittgenstein so effectively dismantled-it's just terribly difficult to define. It is a complicated thing that requires a flexible approach to adequately "capture" it. Thus, there is no "natural" boundary to "religion", but we can define one if we want to (even if the line has been drawn in many ways before). Jonathan Z. Smith advocates just this ('draw your own boundary') approach to the definition of religion in a recent article. He writes:
"Religion" is not a native term; it is created by scholars for their intellectual purposes and therefore is theirs to define. It is a second-order generic concept that plays the same role in establishing a disciplinary horizon that a concept like "language" plays in linguistics or "culture" plays in anthropology. There can be no disciplined study of religion without such a horizon (1998:281-2).
By arguing that "religion" is a second order academic concept, Smith thus provides the freedom for academics to define their own terms of reference. There is some advantage to this argument, as it removes the question of an essence, or the possibility of seeing it as a reality "sui generis" vii (cf. McCutcheon 1997). "Religion" becomes a local language game for the academic study of religion, as Lyotard (1984) proposed for all scientific pursuits after the death of meta-narratives. In a similar spirit, Roger O'Toole argues that the best yardstick to measure a definition of religion is not its "truth", but rather its usefulness for the sociology of religion (1984) . Both of these arguments are consistent with Wittgenstein's notion of "language games", in which the "meaning" of a word is best understood by its use (1968).
Anthropologist Benson Saler (1993) has developed an approach to the definition of religion that has clear parallels with the local language games approach developed by Jonathan Z. Smith, and advocated by O'Toole and Lyotard. In his brilliant book, Conceptualizing Religion, Saler argues that religion is a Western "folk category" which is nonetheless useful in studying "other cultures". Like Peter Byrne (1988) , he argues that we can usefully conceptualize religion using a family resemblance approach. However, since "religion" is first and foremost a Western folk-category, we should acknowledge the point from which "we" begin our analyses-with the prototype of the monotheistic traditions- and what is not religion in "primitive" and "oriental" societies by making explicit comparisons with the (Christian) religion of their own social milieu. The difference, of course, is that Saler builds a moment of self-reflection into the process, and is fully aware that "religion" is a folk category. Whether this approach is adequate for the 21 st century is another question.
In contrast to Saler, Smith and O'Toole, for Timothy Fitzgerald (1996 the way that "religion" is used in local academic language games is precisely the problem.
He argues that (among comparative religionists) religion is a covertly theological term, premised on an ontological category of the sacred. Those who use the term without a covert theological agenda (he uses the examples of anthropologists and sociologists) are merely misled into using terminology that comes with Judeo-Christian theological and Western ideological baggage. Fitzgerald further argues that the concept "religion" offers nothing of value to scholars seeking to understand particular social and cultural formations. In analyses of non-Western societies, like Japan and India, the concept merely distorts our analyses by imposing Western concepts onto non-Western "data" (2000:4). Fitzgerald argues that the best work done in departments of religious studies is really "cultural studies", or "theoretically informed ethnographic studies" which can do without, and is in fact better off without, "religion" at all. He argues that the use of the term "religion" just confuses matters, and distracts from fully social analyses. While I certainly think we should develop fully social understandings of religion, I am not sure that we can do without the concept.
Fitzgerald argues that "religion" distorts the "data" in a way that other concepts do not. The "data" is independent and pre-existing. Interpretation can adequately "reflect", or alternately can "distort" the already given "data" viii . Most (non-positivist) sociologists would see this as a somewhat naïve view. Social theorists writing in the critical tradition (Lukacs 1971, Horkheimer and Adorno 1972) or interpretive tradition (Giddens 1976; see also Rorty 1991a , Taylor 1985 , and even functionalist theorists like Parsons (1968) , argue that there is no such thing as "data" which is independent of interpretation.
In his fascinating discussion of rituals, practices and values in Japan, Fitzgerald argues that what these are about is not religion, but rather "Japaneseness" (2000:159-218).
While he is aware that "Japaneseness" is a hegemonic national project, tied to hierarchy, deference, and the exclusion of outsiders, he treats "Japan" as a relatively unproblematic concept. Nationalists will tell you that "nations" are somehow natural things, but non-nationalist students of nations and nationalism will point out that these are "imagined communities" (cf . Hobsbawm 1990; Wallerstein 1991 and especially Anderson 1990 ). My point is obviously not that "Japan" is not real, but that it is no less of a social construct than "religion". Nations may be imagined entities, but that does not mean that nations are not real, or that they do not have real consequences. The case of India is in some ways even more obvious than Japan (see Wallerstein's article "Does India exist?"(1991)). And yet,
Fitzgerald has no problem referring to the "sociologists of India"-why not "sociologists [or anthropologists, psychologists, historians] of religion"?
While it is not at all clear that we should want to escape from the discourse of religion, it is not even clear that it is possible. Fitzgerald himself does not seem to be able to.
First, "religion" operates as a background category in his writing. For example, a majority of his publications (cited in Fitzgerald 2000) are in journals or books that contain the word "religion" or "religious". This sets the horizon for his discourse, and enables his readers to understand that he is talking about "religion", even if he were able to avoid the "R" word.
Second, some of his language-discussion about "transcendence" (albeit properly de-ontologized) and even more importantly "soteriology" refers (even as it doesn't refer) to religion (cf. 1997:93-95) . His language remains within chains of signification that make sense only insofar as they are linked to "religion". His use of "soteriology", as if it were a "neutral" or "objective" and most importantly "non-theological" word (cf. 2000:121ff) is particularly surprising. Look up the term in any dictionary and you will probably find some variant of "Theol. The doctrine of Salvation" (Oxford English Dictionary) ix .
By arguing that we should not use the word "religion" at all in social studies, Fitzgerald places religion under erasure (Derrida 1997) . By showing that it is almost possible to avoid using the term in academic work on "religion", he sends the concept to the cleaners, demonstrating that when we talk about "religion", we are (really!) talking about "culture" (1997:96). Wittgenstein writes, "[s] ometimes an expression has to be withdrawn from language and sent for cleaning, -then it can be put back into circulation "(1980:39) . It seems to me that although the term needs cleaning-and doubtless it will again-as academics, we also need it in circulation because "[r]eligion [already] circulates in the worldit imposes itself in a particularly palpable manner within the conceptual apparatus of international law and global political rhetoric" (Derrida 1999:29) .
"Religion", Jonathan Z. Smith argues, is an entirely second order academic term which we can use as we want. Timothy Fitzgerald argues that it is a second order ideological academic term, which we should not use at all. Benson Saler argues that it is a second order "folk category" that is nonetheless analytically useful for studying "other" cultures. I think we lose something important in each approaches-ironically in each case-because they do not pay enough attention to the social dimensions of the concept. "Religion" is not a word that is used primarily, or even most often, by scholars. Non-academics make far more use of it, and they do not use it arbitrarily. Nor could they likely (once the word has been learned or introduced) avoid using it entirely. Wittgenstein argued that although we can (even arbitrarily) define words how we want to, this is not how we usually know what words mean. Pace Benson Saler and Timothy Fitzgerald, it is not just a Western (academic) concept-at least not anymore.
Wittgenstein asks the question, "How do I know that this color is red?-It would be an answer to say: 'I have learnt English' " (1968: I §381) . Similarly, we can ask, 'how do I know that this is religion?'-'I have learnt English (or French, German, Japanese, Hindi, etc.)'. People use "religion" as part of their "common language game". When the census or survey researchers ask North Americans, "What is your religion?", or some other variant of this question, people know how to use, and make sense of the word. People will answer "Christian", "Jewish", "Hindu", "Buddhist" or "I am an atheist". Even those who reject the identification of their beliefs and practices with "religion" will give an answer that is appropriate for the question that is asked of them. People who respond saying "nothing in particular" (which still means something), or respond that they are "spiritual" rather than "religious", recognize the relationship between what they are being asked and the answer they give. Despite the very significant differences in what they actually believe, they know how to use the word "religion", and recognize the set of phenomena that we are talking about. This is not insignificant. As Wittgenstein puts it, "[e]ssence is expressed in grammar" (1968: I §371). Or, as we might now prefer to say, it is expressed in "discourse".
The discourse of "religion" is part of the common language game we share.
Part of Fitzgerald's critique of "religion" is that it is a Western social construction that has no meaning in non-Western cultures, and simply serves to distort our analysis.
Although we can trace the genealogy of religion to particular social transformations in Western Europe during the rise of capitalism and the enlightenment, it has become (obviously translated into different languages) a global category. To suggest, as Fitzgerald seems to, that "religion" has no meaning in Japan or India because it is a "foreign" word is not quite true. "Religion" has been imposed as an important legal term in more and more countries, as states have tried to regulate, separate themselves from, or provide freedom to practice it. "Religion" has become part of the global political-economic discourse, enshrined, for example, in article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights x . This has been translated (more or less adequately, no doubt) into more than 300 different languages, from Abhkaz to Zulu, suggesting that the concept has a kind of global currency xi .
Not all states around the world have accepted article 18, nor has it been implemented fullybut the discourse of religion (and its non-English equivalents) has meaning. It is a concept that people know how to use, that is used, and is interpreted.
There is clearly variation in the way that the "religion" words are used in different contexts xii . But the general term is translatable, and people know how to identify what they do (or do not do) in relation to "religion". This is well exemplified by the "World Values survey" conducted by Ronald Inglehart and his colleagues (2000) . This massive research project involved surveys conducted in more than 50 countries around the world. In each country, respondents were asked what their "religion" is, and whether they identified themselves as "religious". In the Japanese survey, 60% of those asked to identify their religion indicated "none" while the rest identified themselves as members of a particular "religion". While I certainly do not want to oversimplify a complex culture, it does appear that "religion" has local meaning, corresponding (albeit in a very rough way) to our concept.
The fact that this question can be asked at all, and the fact that people know how to respond, suggests that this is not a totally meaningless term. The same is true in India, where the survey has been successfully conducted in seven language groups xiii . In response to this question, 84% of Indians identified themselves as Hindu, 8% as Muslim, and only 2% said that they had no religion.
Religion may be a Western folk category, as Benson Saler (1993) argued that since there is no "essence" of religion, no such thing as religion, such a conception must be non-essentialist. Sociologists of religion agree that religion that is a social construction-I have argued that "religion" (as a concept) is, as well.
This non-essentialist conception of religion casts serious doubts on all reified, essentialist conceptions of religion, and should make us extraordinarily cautious about attributing predicates to religion, whether as a part of a theological or a critical statement.
Scholars who fall into opposing camps have traditionally treated religion as an essence, and particular traditions as "manifestations" of that essence. Both religionists with a "liberal ecumenical theological agenda" (as Fitzgerald puts it) and those who want to develop "reductionist" explanations of religion often fall into the same trap of reifying "religion".
Thus, if someone claims that religion is the manifestation of a sacred ontology, or that it is an illusion, they are turning concepts, relationships and names into things.
I am by no means suggesting that we are stuck with common sense conceptions of religion. Particular (and even essentialist) definitions of religion can be useful, interesting or illuminating for particular purposes. Defining religion in a way that bears little or no resemblance to common sense definitions can be important for "recontextualizing" phenomena (Rorty 1991), and developing new understandings of various phenomena xiv . This is an indispensable component of sociological studies-as long as we do not think we are defining what religion (really!) is.
Religion is best identified using a sociologically nominalist family-resemblance approach beginning by denoting particular traditions that are "religions", like Buddhism, Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and those traditions which resemble them in any number of ways (Byrne 1988 , Talliaferro 1998 . This also allows us to conceptualize "quasi-religions" in a fruitful way. What we conceptualize as quasi-religions are phenomena that are usefully interpreted and analyzed using the family of terms and categories (sacredness, sacrifice, ritual, salvation, sin, etc.) we have traditionally used to understand "religions" xv . That is, they are not really sort-of-religions-but it can be useful to look at them in this way.
In our analyses of religion we need to pay close attention to the construction, reconstructions and transformations of the category of our analysis. While we are particularly well advised to be attentive to the stakes of the game within the Academy (cf. There is no essence of religion outside the discourse of religion. There is no religion per se, pour soi, or an sich. Of course, concepts like "religion" have real social consequences, and are important constitutive elements in the construction of global, national and local social formations. In that sense, however, there is such a "thing" as religion-or at least, it is a term we cannot do without-and we "know" what it means. In this respect, Wittgenstein should get the last word: "the best that I can propose is that we should yield
